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Introduction:
In a nutshell, the aim of the project is to build a coherent framework of social and 
political theory around defined case studies of discourse analysis – an analysis of the 
representation of ‘Otherness’ in political and press discourse. 
As this is an aim yet to be attained, I will be talking in the first part of my presentation 
about the theoretical  background of this  project,  and in the second part,  I  will be 
presenting highlights of my recently engaged case studies.  
Part 1: Nation-states, nationalism and democracy, or the “modern 
ideological cluster” (paradigm)
I would like to start this presentation with a quote by the American sociologist, Craig 
Calhoun, which I persistently quote every time I write a presentation of this project:
“Is it possible to build states and even confederations of states in which cohesion and 
self-rule are established through public discourse across lines of difference? Can we 
conceive the growth of a cultural unity within such states or confederations that does 
not  devalue  or  demand  the  obliteration  of  other  sources  of  personal  and  political 
identity? Or must we fall back on nationalism alone as our shelter in a world grown too 
frightening, or as the one immediately satisfying identity with which to confront the 
globalization of capital?”1
These questions, which I personally like to call the “Calhoun project”, are the general 
questions in which my research is involved. It seems to me that 15 years or so since 
1 “Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-determination”; paper first presented 
in June 1991 at the Hungarian Sociological Association. Last retrieved on 14.11.2007 from 
www.ssrc.org/staff/calhoun/publications/nationalism_and_civ_society.pdf. Cf. Craig Calhoun (ed.) 
Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 304–335.
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the “Calhoun project” was formulated,  it  remains a valid, and indeed increasingly 
valid. For instance, it seems that the contemporary issues related to pluralism – at 
least in the context I am concerned with – are not being answered “across lines of 
difference”,  but  dangerously  along these lines.  In  fact,  despite  the calculations  of 
many  globalist  theories  on  the  fall  or  decline  of  Nation-states,  and  despite  the 
enlarged liberalized space of mobility in Europe, I think there is little doubt that the 
Nation-state remains the central political institution. Concurrently, and this is what I 
am concerned with, nationalism (as state ideology and self-determination ideology) 
remains the modern central mode of collective identification.2 
Of course, there is no denying that globalization or the European construction does 
have a  major impact on modern institutions.  In fact,  these phenomena do put the 
Nation-state  into  question,  but  do  not  hamper  its  existence,  and  particularly  its 
(imaginary/ideological) legitimacy. 
The recent expressions and policies of exclusion we have witnessed in most European 
countries, the ongoing debates about immigration and the tightening of related laws 
for instance (in the Netherlands, in France, in Denmark…, but this is only the tip of 
the iceberg) follow and respond to the ideological stance of Nation-states: they show 
(they want to be perceived) as far as these issues are concerned, that they are “in 
power”. This power is exercised along state ideology through (dominant) nationalist 
discourse. When the state’s power or legitimacy is put into question, it relies on the 
ideological grounds of modern state legitimacy: national democracy. 
It is in this sense that the “current state of affaires” I briefly mentioned before, is 
fostering the development for some and the repetition for others of nationalism (in its 
banal or “aggressive” forms). This is based on the belief that nationalism is the sole 
identity formation compatible with modernity, and hence the logical rampart against a 
cultural imperialism undercurrent in globalization. But why is this problematic in the 
light  of  the  “Calhoun  project”?  It  is  because  of  what  I  would  like  to  call  the 
2 Cf. e.g. Michel Sauquet, L’intelligence de l’autre (the intelligence of the other): “The simulatneaous 
existence of the same western cultural forms in certain sectors of certain cities in some of the four 
corners of the world can not be taken as proof that the world is homogeneous. The progressive 
alignment of dressing codes is a superficial phenomenon. A real homogenization would suppose a 
general mutation of representations and imaginaries, which does not correspond to what reality now is. 
La présence simultanée des mêmes formes culturelles occidentales dans certains secteurs de certaines  
villes de certains des quatre coins du monde ne peut guère être prise pour preuve que le monde est  
homogénéisé. L'alignement progressif des codes vestimentaires est un phénomène superficiel. Une 
véritable homogénéisation supposerait une mutation généralisée des représentations et des 
imaginaires, ce qui ne correspond pas à la réalité.” 
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“ideological cluster of modernity” (Zizek would call it a “symbolic field”), i.e. the 
circular legitimating of nationalism and democracy. In my mind, it does not answer 
the contemporary issues in the management of social pluralities: the inclusion of non-
majority  communities,  groups  or  individuals  in  a  reciprocal  cultural  and  political 
equality within the framework of the modern state (and this is the iceberg…).
This is not only problematic in itself (i.e. from a theoretical point of view), it is more 
precisely problematic because societies, at least in Europe, are increasingly aware of 
their plurality – whether accepted or refused, a plurality increasingly complex given 
the fluidity (or hybridity) of peoples (geographically and imaginary). And this may be 
the most  important  influence of  globalization for the purpose of  my research,  the 
fostering of social sensitivity towards identity issues (hence the national “revival”). 
But going back to nationalism, one of the central questions for modernity it claims to 
answer  is  “who are  the  people?”:  and  the  answer  it  provides  is  part  of  the  self-
determining process and of the democratic process i.e. as it gives an answer to the 
“self”, it is a necessary prerequisite for the definition of democratic citizenship. [And 
in  a  certain  sense,  the  process  of  democratization  of  the  national  communities  in 
Europe have reached a certain paroxysm: we cannot on this basis include even more 
people in the community. ]
Yet,  this  answer  does  not  involve  the  existence  (or  even  potential)  plurality  of 
societies. It is, in a certain sense a contradiction, as the equal participation in the polis 
is based on nationality (it used to be even more exclusive, cf. gender equality), the 
boundary between participating in the affaires of the polis and cultural hegemony is 
constantly ambiguous.     
In  short,  the  linkage  between  state  and  society,  between  cultural  and  political 
community, between the polis and the nation, opens a certain gap. In John Breuilly’s 
mind, it is through an ambiguity that nationalism appears to provide an answer to this 
problematic  link.  In  fact,  the  ambiguous  references  of  national  discourse  to  the 
cultural  community on the one hand and to the political  community on the other 
overtake this problematic. 
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Part 2: Hypotheses, the collective imaginary and empirical 
references; or doxa and praxis.
This point forms the first hypothesis of my thesis that the case studies will need to 
confirm or discard. For this hypothesis, I assume that the discourse involved engages 
in an association of terms and significations that exclude other type of significations, 
like the differentiation between cultural community and political community for the 
purpose of  pluralism.  I  would like  at  this  point  to  give  a  short  quote  of  Nicolas 
Sarkozy (NS) which provides with a quite astonishing example: 
“Si on veut vivre avec sa culture, on ne vient pas vivre sur le territoire de la République 
Française” [“If one wants to live with one’s culture, one does not come to live on the 
territory of the French republic”] (Live on France 2, one of the largest French television 
network (France television),  then interior minister, “A vous de juger”, political talk 
show, 30 November 2006,)      
What we see here is the juxtaposition in the same sentence of a (relativist) cultural 
reference to a (universalistic) political reference, all of this very carefully said at first 
with  the  impersonal  pronoun,  while  the  definite  article  (unambiguous,  fix)  then 
defines the reference to France. 
The  question  contained  in  this  first  hypothesis  is  (paraphrasing  Bauman):  does 
political  coexistence (or  which form of  political  coexistence)  necessarily  entails  a 
homogeneous  culture  (what  mode  of  culture)?  Or  more  pragmatically,  do 
contemporary democratic communities have to necessarily be national? The answer to 
this  question would involve an analysis  of this  “necessity” in  terms of imaginary 
associations, or in other words, of the exclusiveness of imaginary associations (are 
there associations that are not necessarily exclusive? If yes, to what extent?3).
This is when the  collective imaginary comes in, as the national imaginary and the 
democratic imaginary, are both exclusive imaginaries on a cultural basis4. It is in fact 
in this imaginary space that processes of exclusion take place. And discourse analysis 
can here provide elements that define the “grid of signification” (Foucault) discourse 
imposes on the imaginary.    
3 E.g. Scottish “new nationalism”: the break-up Britain within the EU. 
4 NB: democracy is exclusive through the “equality postulate”: it is a historical fact that democratic 
forms of power have always been shared among “equals”, i.e. people recognizing each other along 
lines of similarity, of identity. Consequently, there is no real example of the institutionalization of 
democracy with a non-homogeneous cultural community. That is why nationalism provides a very 
effective corollary to democracy: essentially, equality for “us”. 
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The four countries involved in this study are Britain, France, Poland and Sweden. The 
choice of these countries has been determined through the will to engage in a study 
involving  a  varied  panel  of  European  societies.  As  Britain  and  France  are  often 
depicted as mainstream actors of the European concert of nations, I wanted to include 
countries that are not often considered as such. 
What is also more interesting is that each is thought to represent a certain model of 
society. France is famous for its Jacobin republican model, often opposed to Britain’s 
long running multicultural and liberal system. Both also represent post-colonial states 
and societies, with the particularly sensitive approach relative to these issues. Sweden 
for its part is famous for its attractive social model which has for long been thought of 
as a model of integration, and while it faces some difficulties, it is still looked up to. 
Poland, despite a certain multicultural past and a relative immigration since 1991, is 
finally  the  only  country  not  famous  for  an  attractive  model,  but  rather  for  its 
“tradition” of emigration. It is also an evident representative of central and eastern 
European countries, new to the European construction but where political discourse 
often  presents  an  openly  nationalist  tone.  Yet,  many  features  bring  these  four 
countries together; one obvious is their involvement in European affairs, another is 
the migration and integration crisis that stirs the whole of the European community. 
For my concern, I aim at analysing the extent to which there are common processes of 
exclusion despite the obvious differences. 
The study of the dominant discourse will engage in the political discourse on the one 
hand with the  discourse  of  media on the  other,  more  precisely the  daily  national 
newspapers.  It  could be argued that  narrowing the study to daily national  presses 
would  not  be  representative  of  the  modern  media  (referring  more  specifically  to 
television).  Despite  a  certain  decline  of  the  printed  press,  it  still  represents  the 
traditional means for information and formation of popular opinion. As it remains an 
important, accessible and modern medium, it plays a major role in the construction of 
stereotypes and representations of identity and otherness.     
I would like to draw upon a case study I just started to describe my methodology 
concerning  the  imaginary,  i.e.  to  describe  some  of  the  processes  through  which 
imaginary exclusion is performed. The case study concerns France, and particularly 
the discourse on immigration and national identity which has been on the front stage 
for a good few years now.  
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The debate has crystallized during the presidential election campaign earlier this year 
when the  creation  of  a  new ministry  dealing  both  with  immigration  and national 
identity  appeared  as  one  the  15  points  of  NS  presidential  project  (“immigration 
control”).  The  ministry  for  immigration,  integration,  national  identity  and 
codevelopment was finally created creation six months ago (31 May) and is widely 
being referred to in the media as the “ministry for immigration and national identity”. 
At first glance, it seems that it is the association of terms that has shaken the opinion 
and the opposition, but when we look closer, it is the creation of a single ministry (for 
two competences) that stirs the opinion rather than the name of it. What obviously 
overtones  in  the  name of  the  ministry  is  that  immigration  is  a  threat  to  national 
identity; but threat discourse is far from being the monopoly of NS, e.g. it can also be 
found in the discourse of the political opposition, in Segolène Royal’s presidential 
campaign  project  (the  expulsion  and  foreigners  when  there  are  “dangerous 
criminals”)5. 
As far as the mainstream press is concerned, I do not have enough references now to 
say more than that alternative readings are rare (I have in one week found only one 
article, an “expert analysis”, that does in fact propose an alternative approach). But 
this is, in my mind, linked to my second hypothesis that dominant discourse calls for 
itself, and it is very hard to oppose it in different categories that those it “imposes”. 
Consequently,  even  though  one  can  find  opposing  political  stances,  the  grid  of 
signification remains virtually untouched. 
Coming back to the case study, one has also to note a very important aspect: NS had 
been interior minister for the previous government, and as interior minister he was 
then in charge of immigration policies. And this association has precedence: one of 
the first laws NS drafted was the “law related to immigration control, the sojourning 
of foreigners and nationality” (Loi no. 2003-119, 26 November 2003). 
Since then the discourse of the would-be president and his supporters has grown very 
strongly around these themes. Here is a short sample of NS and the UMP’s rationale 
about immigration that has been repeated throughout the past few years:
In the “banlieues”, we are paying the price of an immigration policy that was neither 
chosen,  nor  wanted,  nor  claimed  or  organized;  but  the  accumulation  in  certain 
neighbourhoods of sons and grandsons of foreigners who never had any formation, any 
5 She explained later that she was not “talking about those that have grown up in France, but those you 
have arrived not long ago.”
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education,  any  job  has  created  real  powder  magazines.  I  conclude  that  one  has  to 
control immigration.6 
Public discourse was systematically filled with discourse on immigration and national 
identity, etc. In short, it has been banalized and it has consequently become part of the 
dominant discourse. 
And it  is  in  this  light  interesting to  note  that  none of  the  policies  from the  new 
ministry  do anything but  mentioning the  relationship (threat)  of  immigration with 
national identity. Here is an extract from the press conference the new minister for 
immigration and national identity, Brice Hortefeux (BH) gave on the 8 November 
2007.  It  it  is  the starting point  to the reasons why the minister  sees new tougher 
immigration laws are necessary:
“First of all, let us be honest: the French integration system has failed. The proof is the 
much to high concentration of population of foreign origin in only three regions out of 
22: 60% of foreigners live in Ile-de-France, Rhône-Alpes or in PACA, sometimes in 
real  urban  ghettos.  Another  proof  is  the  average  unemployment  rate  of  foreigners, 
above 20%, which is more than twice the national average. In certain “banlieues”, this 
rate reaches to 40%. We have to say the truth to the French people: our integration 
system is  no more a  model.  And to  success in integration,  one has  first  to control 
immigration.” 7
What  I  would  like  to  point  at  here,  both  in  the  previous  “sample”  and  in  BH’s 
declaration is the exact ellipsis we find in the laws. We can see of course that there is 
the same correlation that overtones immigration as threatening the national identity. 
But more precisely, we see that the reason for a new (future) immigration policy is 
need because of the errors of the previous one(s). In short, we find in both cases the 
mention that there is a situation inside, and this is indeed very important because this 
were the ellipsis appears: while we find the acknowledgment that there is a situation 
that has to be answered, the answer leads us to immigration control and not to what 
6E.g. « Dans les banlieues, nous payons le prix d’une politique de l’immigration qui n’a été ni choisie, 
ni voulue, ni revendiquée, ni organisée ; mais l’accumulation dans certains quartiers de fils et petit fils 
d’étrangers à qui on n’a donné ni formation, ni éducation, ni emploi a conduit à de véritables 
poudrières. J’en tire la conclusion qu’il faut maîtriser l’immigration, qu’on ne peut pas accepter tout le 
monde pour donner la chance de l’intégration à ceux qui ne l’ont pas. » “A vous de juger”, political talk 
show, 30 November 2006
7 « D’abord, osons regarder la vérité en face : le système français d’intégration a échoué. J’en veux 
pour preuve la concentration beaucoup trop forte de la population d’origine étrangère sur seulement 
trois régions sur vingt-deux : 60% des étrangers habitent en Ile-de-France, en Rhône-Alpes ou en 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, parfois dans de véritables ghettos urbains. J’en veux aussi pour preuve le 
taux de chômage moyen des étrangers, supérieur à 20 %, soit plus du double de la moyenne nationale. 
Dans certaines banlieues, ce taux atteint les 40%. Il faut donc dire la vérité aux Français : notre système 
d’intégration n’est plus un modèle. Et pour réussir l’intégration, il faut d’abord maîtriser 
l’immigration. » http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/iminidco/salle_presse_832/discours_tribunes 
_835/ discours_brice_hortefeux_presse_57958.html 
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society inside is concerned with. It seems to me that it this “gap” in significations is 
very  important  the  processes  of  imaginary  exclusion.  The  “logic”  of  the  linkage 
between  immigration  and  national  identity  (or  vice  versa)  imposes  a  grid  if 
significations where the association (i.e.  the inclusion) of a certain fringe (French 
citizens of foreign origins living in the poor suburbs8) of the existing French society is 
made unthinkable, or in Foucault’s words, is forbidden. We can describe it in formal 
terms through the logic of amalgamate (“population of foreign origins”/ “sons and 
grandsons of foreigners” become not integrated “foreigners”), but also in terms of 
imaginary processes of exclusion. The linkage between one the hand immigration (i.e. 
the question of newcomers) and national identity (the shared collective references, the 
shared grid of significations, etc.) aims at draw a line between those that can easily fit 
the grid of significations and those that would need an adjustment: the effect of this 
discourse of exclusion has a direct effect on the majority imaginary. But it aims at a 
secondary effect  on the  minority/stereotyped/excluded community:  it  renders  their 
own imaginary unviable if including themselves in the French community. The space 
which is left in between is the important exclusive process as it is only in this space 
that inclusion can take effect. 
Before concluding, I would like to relate an interesting anecdote that came out after 
the suburban riots in France in 2005. Given a increased amount of identity checks in 
the so-called “dangerous” suburbs, there was this advice from some young people9 
(who are the main targets of the id checks) to have their electoral card at the front of 
their wallets. The aim was to show the policemen (representing the state authority, but 
indirectly NS as interior minister) that “we” are part of the same political community. 
The effect of this was supposedly for the police to be less inclined to be hard on them. 
What I find interesting here, is indeed the attempt to fill the imaginary space I have 
described, and that this effort has come from the “excluded” (yet, I cannot tell to what 
extent this fulfilled its aim or made it more complicated). 
Conclusion
My aim here was to try raising some hypothesis: 
8 To make it short, it is easily understood that the peoples NS points to are Muslims. Cf. His preference 
for a Christian/White Europe, and in his campaign video clip on immigration, the example he uses to 
describe French values (the rights of women).
9 NB. This was used later by Segolène Royal during her campaign to incite young people to vote (for 
her).
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→ Through stereotyping, oversimplifying implications, scapegoating, threat and risk 
discourse, the ambiguity of who is included or not in the community, maintains the 
game  of  nationalist  significations  of  confusion  between  political  and  cultural 
communities. The political motives are usually left out in the press mediation of this 
discourse: we end up with a culturalist grid of signification.  
→ Dominant discourse calls for itself, the grid of signification it imposes excludes or 
renders no mediating space (hybrid, plural). It imposes a mode of using categories the 
“other” is compelled to understand and use to be himself understood or taken notice 
of, e.g. NS: “racism is not only French, it is also immigrant” (talking about French 
people of immigration origins). This process ends up in what I have described as an 
imaginary gap. 
→  The  paradigm  of  modernity  (cf.  the  ideological  cluster)  plays  a  role  in  the 
exclusion  processes  as  it  is  based  on  what  Edgar  Morin  has  called  the 
hypersimplification  of  the  modern  mind.  In  this  sense,  the  implications  from the 
preivous  two  hypthesis  would  impact  on  this  paradigm.  For  instance:  what  the 
dominant grid of signification excludes is a complexity (plurality) of society, in this 
sense the inclusion of diversity could mean the inclusion of complexity, in imaginary 
terms, a (more) complex grid of signification. It is on this level that an imaginary 
“mutation” (cf. footnote no.2) would take place. 
[→ Following, the contemporary dominant discourse adds a third party to the game of 
significations  which  involves  additional  confusion  to  legitimize  a  certain 
exclusion/inclusion pattern: market economy/liberalism/neo-liberalism.]
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